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ABSTRACT
What is the force of attraction of cities? Leading explanations include the advantages of a con-
centrated market and knowledge spillovers. This paper develops a model of ﬁrm location decisions
in which it is possible to distinguish the importance of the concentrated-market motive from other
motives, including knowledge spillovers. A key aspect of the model is that it allows for the ﬁrm
to choose multiple locations. The theory is applied to study the placement of manufacturing sales
oﬃces. The implications of the concentrated-market motive are found to be a salient feature of
U.S. Census micro data. The structural parameters of the model are estimated. The concentrated-
market motive is found to account for approximately half of the concentration of sales oﬃces in
large cities.
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What is the force of attraction of cities? The economics literature focuses primarily
on two theories. The ﬁrst theory is that cities facilitate the diﬀusion of knowledge, raising
productivity. Recent work on the knowledge-spillover theory includes Eaton and Eckstein
(1997), Black and Henderson (1999), Glaeser (1999), and Lucas (2001). The second theory
highlights the importance of transportation costs, scale economies, and product variety. If
a large number of people are concentrated in a single place, by trading amongst themselves
they enjoy the consumption of a wide variety of products, without anything (or anybody)
having to go a long distance. Krugman (1991) formalizes this result; Fujita, Krugman,
and Venables (1999) provide a survey of more recent developments. Though this theory is
o f t e nc a l l e dt h eeconomic geography theory, Ic a l li tt h econcentrated-market theory, since the
knowledge-spillover theory is also an economic geography theory.1
There is little work quantifying the importance of the concentrated-market theory
relative to the knowledge-spillover theory.2 This is an important issue for several reasons.
First, the policy ramiﬁcations of the two theories are potentially very diﬀerent. The litera-
ture on knowledge spillovers usually models the spillovers as an externality; there is no such
externality in the concentrated-market theory. This is not to say that concentrated-market
models won’t have distortions of their own; the key point is that the structure of the prob-
lems is diﬀerent, making for diﬀerent welfare analyses. Second, while both theories predict
the emergence of cities, they potentially diﬀer in their predictions as to how technological
change will aﬀect cities. In particular, there is great interest in understanding how the re-
cent information revolution will aﬀect cities. Third, concentrated-market type models are
generally much more complicated to work out than knowledge-spillover models. To motivate
1It is common in the literature to add a third theory to this list, input-market pooling, but that explanation
is beyond the scope of this paper.
2Exceptions discussed below include Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser
(forthcoming). There is some work in the international trade literature, Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999),
that examines the related question of distinguishing the concentrated-market theory from the Hecksher-Ohlin
theory in explaining specialization of countries.the use of this more complicated structure, the concentrated-market theory should help us
understand empirical observations in a way that the knowledge-spillover theory cannot.
In this paper, I shed light on this broad issue by tackling the following question: What
is the relative importance of the concentrated-market factor and the knowledge-spillover factor
in determining the location patterns of manufacturer sales oﬃces? T h i si sm u c hn a r r o w e r
than my broad issue, but the issues are related. And the narrow question is much easier to
answer and has certain properties that make it interesting.
Sales oﬃces are ideal for my study for three reasons. First, as discussed further below,
both factors are plausibly important a priori, and this makes for an interesting horse race.
Second, sales-oﬃce work is in many ways representative of the white-collar, information-
oriented work that is now the principal work of cities, so the results may be more broadly
applicable. Third, this paper develops a methodology for separating out the concentrated-
market factor from other factors and the sales-oﬃce sector has certain characteristics that
make it ideal for a ﬁrst use of this methodology.
Distinguishing the concentrated-market explanation from the knowledge-spillover ex-
planation is a challenge. The concentrated-market explanation involves transportation costs
and scale economies, and these may be diﬃcult to quantify. It is even harder to measure
knowledge spillovers (though Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) manage to do this
for one case). The recent studies of Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Dumais, Ellison,
and Glaeser (forthcoming) attempt to directly control for these various factors. While these
papers do succeed in coming up with some clever measures, the papers recognize that the
measures employed have limitations. The new approach developed in this paper avoids these
measurement diﬃculties. It follows the spirit of work in the industrial organization literature
that uses demand shifts to infer information about other parameters (e.g., Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991)).
To understand the idea of the approach, forget about sales oﬃces for a moment and
2consider a general industry with diﬀerentiated products in which some products have ex-
ogenously greater demands than other products. Suppose that the two elements of the
concentrated-market factor, transportation cost and scale economies, both matter and that
knowledge spillovers do not matter. My key theoretical result is that low-demand and high-
demand products will diﬀer in the distribution of production in a systematic way. Prod-
ucts with high demand have suﬃcient scale to sustain multiple locations of production; low-
demand products can at best sustain a single plant in the entire economy. This diﬀerence
in number of plants leads to a distinct diﬀerence in the pattern of plant location. As ex-
plained below, plants producing low-demand goods are more likely to be found in both the
largest cities and the smallest cities and are less likely to be found in medium-sized cities, as
compared to high-demand products. This implication of the concentrated-market theory is
sharply diﬀerent from that of the knowledge-spillover theory. The latter theory predicts no
systematic relation between the level of exogenous demand and the pattern of location. The
distinct implications of the two theories provides the basis for identiﬁcation.
In the application of this approach to sales oﬃces, the “product” is the sales service
for intermediating a particular manufacturer’s product. “Demand” is the total national sales
of the particular manufacturer. The ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis determines how the
placement of sales oﬃces varies with the sales size of the ﬁrm (the demand measure), using
conﬁdential U.S. Census micro data. A salient pattern of these data is that large ﬁrms are
relatively concentrated in medium-sized cities while small ﬁrms are relatively concentrated
in both the smallest and the largest cities. This is consistent with the concentrated-market
theory and cannot be generated by the knowledge-spillover theory. I interpret this ﬁnding
as evidence that the concentrated-market theory plays at least some role.
The second part of the empirical analysis estimates the structural parameters of the
model. The estimates indicate that the concentrated-market theory is on the order of half of
the explanation for why sales oﬃces are concentrated in large cities, with the balance being
3accounted for by a composition of forces, including knowledge spillovers and Hecksher-Ohlin
eﬀects. I conclude that the concentrated-market forces are at least of the same order of
magnitude as knowledge-spillover forces.
The third part of my analysis uses the structural estimates to return to the broader
issue of why cities form in the ﬁrst place. The estimated transportation cost savings of
consolidating people into large cities are found to be large in that they outweigh a beneﬁt
from dispersion, a force that is allowed for in the estimated model. To the extent that the
transportation cost factor is of a similar magnitude in other white-collar work, this saving is
a force in the formation of cities.
In the remainder of the introduction, I ﬁrst present some intuition for the main theo-
retical ﬁnding. I then discuss sales oﬃces and further develop why looking at them can shed
light on the issues raised above.
A. The Theoretical Result
In the theoretical model, the ﬁrm solves a static problem of where to set up sales
oﬃces. The environment has four key elements. First, a ﬁx e dc o s ti si n c u r r e df o re a c h
oﬃce opened. This scale economy is a force of concentration. Second, a transportation
cost is incurred when a city lacks a sales oﬃce to intermediate local sales. This is a force
of dispersion. Balancing only these two oﬀsetting forces, the ﬁrm is led to place oﬃces in
the largest cities, where a given expenditure in ﬁxed cost results in the largest savings of
transportation cost. These ﬁrst two forces capture the concentrated-market theory. Third,
there is heterogeneity across ﬁrms in the relative suitability of diﬀerent cities as locations for
oﬃces. For various idiosyncratic reasons, a particular ﬁrm might ﬁnd Enid, Oklahoma–
the smallest U.S. metro area–to be a highly productive place to put a sales oﬃce (e.g.,
the ﬁrm might have a manufacturing plant or central headquarters nearby). So this ﬁrm
may chose to locate in Enid rather than New York City. Fourth, on average, ﬁrms tend
to be more productive in larger cities than smaller cities. This fourth factor captures the
4knowledge-spillover force.
If ﬁrms were constrained to choose only a single location, there would be no way
to distinguish the concentrated-market theory from the knowledge-spillover theory. Firms
would tend to locate in the largest cities because of both the transportation cost savings
and the productivity advantages. But ﬁrms are not constrained to choose a single location.
Large ﬁrms have suﬃcient economies of scale to aﬀord multiple oﬃce locations, and this
opens up the avenue for identiﬁcation.
My main theoretical result is that when the forces of the concentrated-market theory
are at work, the location patterns of large (multi-oﬃce) ﬁrms will systematically diﬀer from
small (single-oﬃce) ﬁrms in two ways. First, small ﬁrms are relatively more concentrated
in large cities. A small ﬁrm has only a single oﬃce and so is likely to put it in New York.
Large ﬁrms have an oﬃce in New York and other very large cities, and they have oﬃces
in medium-sized cities like Nashville. Second, and more surprisingly, small ﬁrms are more
concentrated in the smallest cities as well. To understand the result, suppose that for a
particular small ﬁrm, the largest cities like New York are unsuitable for various idiosyncratic
reasons. So the ﬁrm is left to compare medium-sized cities like Nashville with small cities
like Enid. Nashville’s advantage over Enid in being close to more consumers is relatively
inconsequential since the ﬁrm sells to the nation as a whole. (Nashville’s population is a
trivial percentage of the total national population.) So when comparing Nashville and Enid,
the small ﬁrm puts more weight on other factors besides access to the local consumers. In
contrast, a large ﬁrm with its multiple oﬃces can obtain relatively complete coverage of
medium-sized cities; the objective of close access to customers in medium-sized cities will get
relatively large weight in its site location strategy. Another way to think about the intuition
is to recall the usual tension between being close to downstream demand or upstream supply
in site location decisions (e.g., as discussed Hoover (1975)). Since small ﬁrms have only one
oﬃce, it is not feasible to locate close to demand (except perhaps if they locate in New York).
5So they worry about locating close to supply (i.e., a low-cost location, which may be in a
small city). Big ﬁrms can locate close to demand since they have multiple oﬃces, so they
focus relatively more on demand than supply.
B .W h yL o o ka tS a l e sO ﬃces?
Sales oﬃces are the home bases of salespeople who work for manufacturers like General
Mills and who make sales calls on wholesalers and large retailers like Wal-Mart. In the
1997 Economic Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001)), there were 29,305 sales oﬃces
accounting for approximately $1.3 trillion in sales, $46 billion in payroll, and almost a million
employees. According to Census statistics, about half of these employees are directly engaged
in selling activities and the other half are engaged in support activities, such as oﬃce and
clerical work. Sales oﬃces are highly concentrated in large cities. As documented in Section
3, per capita sales of oﬃces are ten times larger in the largest cities than in rural areas.
My ﬁrst reason for looking at sales oﬃc e si st h a ti tp r o v i d e sa ni n t e r e s t i n gh o r s er a c e .
There are good a priori reasons to think that both the concentrated-market factor and the
knowledge-spillover factor are important reasons sales oﬃces are concentrated in big cities.
Consider knowledge spillovers ﬁrst. A salesperson’s job is to match the needs of customers
with the products of the ﬁrm; information is the essence of this job. A salesperson needs to
know the market–not just the product line carried by his or her ﬁrm, but also the products
oﬀered by competing as well as complementary ﬁrms. In a large city, this kind of information
is likely to spill over from contacts with others.
There are also compelling reasons to think that the forces at work also include the
three factors underlying the concentrated-market theory: transportation cost, product diﬀer-
entiation, and scale economies.
Transportation costs are obviously important for sales oﬃces. Writers in the concen-
trated-market literature, beginning with Krugman (1991) routinely list manufactured goods
as the prototypical good for which transportation costs are important. But surely the trans-
6portation cost of moving people dwarfs the cost of moving the vast majority of manufacturing
goods. A salesperson in New York may need to participate in a one-hour meeting with a
client in Los Angeles. The round trip time cost for such a one-hour meeting is a full working
day. Face-to-face communication is clearly a crucial element of success in sales. A priori, it
seems very likely that economizing on the transportation cost of moving people is a ﬁrst-order
consideration in determining the spatial patterns of sales-oﬃce activity.
Product diﬀerentiation in this sector is important; in fact, it is extreme. For most
sectors, it can be very diﬃcult to determine the extent of product diﬀerentiation. Whether
or not Kellogg’s Raisin Bran should be considered a diﬀerentiated product from Post Raisin
Bran is a hard question (see Nevo (2001)). But whatever the answer to this question, it is
clear that the intermediation services provided by the sales oﬃces distributing these products
are extremely diﬀerentiated: It is not possible to obtain the Post product from a Kellogg’s
sales oﬃce, and it is not possible to obtain the Kellogg’s product from a Kraft sales oﬃce
(the corporate parent of Post). The substitution possibilities are zero.
Scale economies also matter. There are obvious ﬁxed costs in setting up sale oﬃces,
e.g., the oﬃce manager, receptionist, rent.
For these reasons, the concentrated-market theory and the knowledge-spillover theory
are both plausible explanations for why sales oﬃces are concentrated in big cities. But there
is yet a third explanation that should be brought up at this point. Big cities systematically
diﬀer from less urban areas in factor compositions, and the sales-oﬃce sector intensively uses
factors that tend to be found in big cities. The sector employs very well paid, white-collar
workers. (Payroll per person is $50,000 in the 1997 Census.) Workers in large cities on average
have higher skill levels than workers in small cities (Glaeser and Mare (2001)). The sales-oﬃce
sector uses airport services and entertainment services (ballgames, restaurants, for example)
intensively, and these services are more readily available in larger cities. Thus sales oﬃces
might concentrate in cities for standard Hecksher-Ohlin—type reasons. In the analysis, I am
7unable to separately identify the productivity advantages arising from knowledge spillover
from those arising because of Hecksher-Ohlin eﬀects. However, given my a priori belief that
the Hecksher-Ohlin eﬀects are nonnegative, I can obtain a lower bound on the concentrated-
market eﬀect relative to the knowledge-spillover eﬀect.
My second reason for focusing on sales oﬃces is that the work done by salespeople
is in many ways representative of the information-oriented work that is the principal work
of cities. This white-collar work includes ﬁnance, insurance, legal services, wholesale trade,
consultants, and so forth. Much of this kind of work involves people meeting with other
people, just like salespeople making calls on consumers. The time cost of travelling to
meetings is surely an important consideration.
My third reason for focusing on sales oﬃces is that they are particularly amenable to
application of my methodology. My approach examines what happens across products. To
make such comparisons, I need clean product boundaries. In general it is diﬃcult to cleanly
determine the boundaries of diﬀerentiated products and to obtain detailed production data at
the level of diﬀerentiated products. Census data by SIC codes aggregate diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts to a degree that varies from one SIC code to the next. But for sales-oﬃce services, the
boundaries between products correspond to ﬁrm boundaries, and these are cleanly delineated
in the Census data. Besides clean product boundaries, I need exogenous shifts in demand
across products. Since the costs of the sales oﬃces are only a small percentage of sales, it is
plausible that these costs have only a small impact on the quantity of a manufacturer’s total
sales. Hence, when studying the placement of sales oﬃces, as a ﬁr s ts t e pi tm i g h tn o tb e
unreasonable to assume that total sales are exogenous and use total sales as my measure of
demand.
2. The Model
I model the problem of a ﬁrm choosing a set of cities in which to put sales oﬃces as
well as the allocation of sales across oﬃces. The model is highly stylized, capturing the key
8tensions in stark form.
The ﬁrst part of this section describes the environment. The second part presents
a formal statement of the ﬁrm’s problem. The third part determines the solution in the
limiting cases where the ﬁrm is extremely small and extremely large. The third part also
makes the important point that if the ﬁrm were constrained to choose only a single oﬃce,
there would be no way to distinguish the concentrated-market force from other forces.
A. The Environment
There are J cities in the economy, numbered 1 through J.L e t A = {1,2,...,J} denote
the set of all cities, and let nj be the population city j. Cities are ordered by increasing size,
nj ≤ nj+1. Normalize the total population to equal 1,
PJ
j=1 nj =1 .
Firms are indexed by i, i ∈ {1,2,...,I}.L e t qi be the total national sales of ﬁrm
i. This is taken to be exogenous with respect to the sales-oﬃce location decision considered
here. Since the expenses of sales oﬃces are a relatively small proportion of total sales
(7.5 percent), the assumption of exogenous sales may be a useful approximation for a ﬁrst
cut. Assume, in addition, that the ﬁrm’s sales are evenly distributed across the cities in the
economy in proportion to population; i.e., qij = njqi. This is palatable for consumer goods
but is obviously less palatable for products such as agricultural equipment.
The problem faced by ﬁrm i is to set up a network of sales oﬃces to minimize inter-
mediation cost, taking the sales quantity qij = njqi delivered to city j as ﬁxed. There are
three components to the intermediation cost: selling costs, trade friction, and ﬁxed costs. I
describe each in turn.
Each unit of product sold requires a certain processing called the selling activity, and
this activity must be undertaken by a facility called a sales oﬃce. The cost of conducting
this selling activity in a particular city by a particular ﬁrm is assumed to vary both across
cities and across ﬁrms. Let cij be the cost to ﬁrm i of conducting the selling activity in city j,
per unit of goods processed. I defer until later the important topic of how cij is determined.
9T h e r ei sat r a d ef r i c t i o ni n c u r r e dw h e nas a l e so ﬃce at location j conducts the selling
activity for sales at location k.T h e t r a d e f r a c t i o n i s tjk per unit of sales processed. Assume
that
tjk = τ, j 6= k, (1)
=0 , j = k.
Thus the friction is completely avoided if the sales are processed by an oﬃce in the same
city. If the sales are processed by out-of-town oﬃces, the friction is τ, regardless of which
out-of-town oﬃce does the selling. This friction is meant to capture the degradation in
service when a telephone call is used as a substitute for face-to-face communication. Or it
can capture the travel cost to conduct the selling services. But note that this travel cost
does not vary with distance between cities.
The ﬁnal component of the distribution cost is the ﬁx e dc o s to fs e t t i n gu pa no ﬃce.
Assume there is a ﬁxed cost of φ that must be incurred for each oﬃce set up. This ﬁxed cost
is constant across ﬁrms i and cities j, unlike the selling cost cij which does vary with i and j.
I return to the issue of how the selling cost cij is determined. It equals
cij = c − αnj − βzj + εij, (2)
for α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.T h e p a r a m e t e r c is a positive constant. The second term is meant
to capture the knowledge-spillover eﬀect. The larger the city, the systematically lower the
cost on account of spillover beneﬁts. The third term is meant to capture Hecksher-Ohlin
factors. Cities vary in a characteristic zj that can be interpreted, for example, as some
measure of worker quality or some measure of airport access or both. To make things as
simple as possible, assume the quality characteristic varies in a systematic way with city size.
In particular, assume the deterministic relationship zj = ωnj,f o rω ≥ 0. Then the cost can
10be written as
cij = c − αnj − βωnj + εij
= c − γnj + εij, (3)
for
γ ≡ α + βω. (4)
The γ parameter combines the spillover force as well as the Hecksher-Ohlin factor that bigger
cities have higher quality inputs. Since both factors come from the supply side, I call γ the
composite supply-side parameter. From the perspective of the ﬁrm’s location problem, all
that matters is the composite eﬀect. But note that if we were to consider a social planner’s
problem of choosing how large to make cities, the breakdown (4) would matter. If more
people were added to a city but the characteristic zj o ft h ec i t yw e r et or e m a i nﬁxed, the
eﬀect on cost would be only the spillover eﬀect α and not the composite eﬀect γ.I n t h e d a t a
on ﬁrm location decisions that I look at, it will only be possible to identify the composite γ
and not the breakdown. But since β ≥ 0 and ω ≥ 0, ap r i o r i , γ is an upper bound for α.
The last term εi,j in the cost is a random term that is speciﬁct oﬁrm i.T h i s t e r m
captures idiosyncratic diﬀerences in preferences across ﬁrms. For example, it may be that
ﬁrm i has a factory or a corporate headquarters in a particular city j.I f a s a l e s o ﬃce is
located in j, the synergies of having the oﬃce near the factory or corporate headquarters
reduces the selling cost cij compared to what it would be otherwise. Or perhaps running the
sales oﬃce of a particular ﬁrm i requires a particular kind of manager or a particular talent
that is speciﬁct oﬁrm i.T h i s ﬁrm-speciﬁc talent may be available in some cities and not
others.
It is intuitive that the larger the city, the more likely it is that a ﬁrm might be able
to ﬁnd an unusual talent. And if its factories were randomly distributed proportionally to
11population, then the larger the city, the larger the probability of a factory. To capture this
intuitive notion, the value of the random term εi,j is assumed to be the ﬁrst-order statistic
(from below) of nj draws of a variable x, i.e.,
εi,j =m i n {xi,j,1,xi,j,2,...,xi,j,nj}, (5)
where the xi,j,k are i.i.d. draws from some ﬁxed distribution F(x).3 With this cost structure,
a city that is twice as large gets twice as many idiosyncratic draws x (e.g., twice the possibility
of ﬁnding a rare ﬁrm-speciﬁc talent). A particularly convenient case is where the random ˜ x
are drawn from the double exponential distribution used in the logit model,
pr(˜ x ≥ x)=1− F(x)=e
−ξex
, (6)
with parameters ξ.4 In this case, the distribution of the ﬁrst-order statistic remains in the
same family,
pr(˜ εi,j ≥ x)=e
−njξex
,
with parameter njξ instead of ξ.
Observe that with the distribution structure embodied in (5) there are two forces
that tend to reduce the selling cost in large cities: (1) the composite supply term −γnj
and (2) the shift to a more favorable distribution of εi,j with larger population. Perhaps
a more typical approach would include the ﬁrst force but leave out the second force of the
shifted distribution. But that approach would be unsatisfactory for my purposes. I want
the parameter γ to capture the forces that would tend to lead ﬁrms to locate oﬃces in big
cities disproportionate to their population; without assumption (5), γ would not capture this.
With assumption (5), when γ =0the probability that a given city has the lowest cost is
proportionate to population.
3T h e r ei sa na b u s eo fn o t a t i o nh e r es i n c eh e r enj is an integer number of draws (corresponding to the
location’s integer population) whereas elsewhere in the paper nj indicates a city’s population share.
4An additional parameter can be added in this speciﬁcation as a coeﬃcient on x in the exponential function.
But without loss of generality, this coeﬃcient is normalized to 1.
12B. The Firm’s Problem
To formally write down the ﬁrm’s problem, it is useful to introduce some additional
notation. Let χj be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm opens an oﬃce in location
j and 0 otherwise. (The i subscript for ﬁrm i is implicit for the rest of this section.) Let
χ =( χ1,...,χJ) be the vector of indicator variables for each city. Let yj,k denote the fraction
of selling services conducted by an oﬃce at location j for sales in location k,a n dl e ty be
the matrix formed by the elements yj,k.T h e ﬁrm picks χ,t h es e to fo ﬃce locations, and
y, the allocation of sales across oﬃces, to deliver qnk sales services to each location. The
















subject to the constraint that
J X
j=1
yj,k =1 , for all k,
yj,k ≥ 0, for all j, k,
and
χj =1 ,i fyj,k > 0, for any j, k.
It is straightforward to characterize the solution to this problem. It is useful to deﬁne
B to be the set of locations with a sales oﬃce,
B =
n
j: such that χj =1
o
.
If there is a sales oﬃce at location j, i.e., j ∈ B, then clearly in any solution this sales oﬃce
conducts all of the selling activities required for city j, yj,j =1 . Suppose in a solution there
is some city k without a sales oﬃce. The selling service for such a city is conducted by
13the oﬃce with the lowest marginal cost, since the transportation cost is the same for all the
out-of-town ﬁrms. Denote the lowest cost location as j∗,
j
∗ =a r gm i n
j∈B cj.
Location j∗ is called the export location because it handles all out-of-town transactions. In
a solution with an export location j∗,i fa no ﬃce is open at j 6= j∗,t h eﬁxed cost and selling
costs for the oﬃce at j must be less than the cost of importing the selling services from j∗;
i.e.,
cjnjq + φ ≤ (cj∗ + τ)njq,f o rj 6= j
∗ and j ∈ B. (8)
C. The Solution in Limiting Cases
Observe that the solution to problem (7) depends on the ﬁxed cost φ and the ﬁrm scale
q only through the ratio φ/q. In this subsection, I determine the solution in the extreme
case where the ﬁrm is small (so the ratio φ/q is large) and in the extreme case where the ﬁrm
is large (so the ratio φ/q is small). These solutions will be used in the next section to derive
the implications of the model. It is also shown here that if ﬁrms could choose only a single
oﬃce, the transportation cost parameter τ and the composite supply eﬀect γ could not be
separately identiﬁed.





Under condition (9), there is a single oﬃce in the optimal conﬁguration. To see why, recall
that the reason for opening up a second oﬃce is to reduce the out-of-town cost. But under
condition (9), φ > τq,s ot h eﬁxed cost of opening one extra oﬃce exceeds the trade friction
incurred on the entire population (which again is normalized to equal 1).
14It is convenient here to divide the ﬁrm’s objective function by total sales q and to
restate the objective as minimizing average total cost. When the ﬁrm has a single oﬃce and
puts the oﬃce at city j, the average total cost is













− (γ + τ)nj + εj.
The ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst line is the selling cost per unit. The second term is the trade friction
that is incurred on all sales, except for the local sales nj of the oﬃce in j.T h e t h i r d t e r m i s
average ﬁxed cost. The second line substitutes in equation (2) for cj. Rearranging terms,
we see that the third line expresses average total cost as a constant, a term that depends
upon nj and a random term. The ﬁrm picks the location that minimizes ATCj.
Equation (10) for average total cost highlights the fundamental identiﬁcation problem
faced in this paper. The sum of γ and τ enters multiplicatively with city size nj.H i g h e r
values of τ and γ increase the relative advantage of large cities in the same way. There
is no way to separately identify γ from τ. There is no way to sort out the importance of
the concentrated-market factor (which depends upon the τ parameter) from the knowledge-
spillover and the Hecksher-Ohlin factors (both of which are in the γ parameter).
For the results of the next section, it is useful to derive a formula for the probability
that city j is the location with the lowest average total cost. In the logit case where εj has





The location quotient (LQ) is a commonly used statistic that normalizes sales at a
location by population at the location. It equals a location’s share of sales divided by a
location’s share of the population. When the ﬁrm is small and the logit case applies, the

















where the superscript S indicates this is the expected LQ for the “Small” ﬁrm. The expected
share of sales for location j is simply the probability that the single oﬃce is located at j.
Observe that if τ =0and γ =0 ,t h e nLQj =1for all j. Here expected sales activity
is proportionate to population–there are no τ or γ forces to disproportionately concentrate
oﬃces in big cities. But if either τ > 0 or γ > 0,t h e nLQj is strictly increasing in city size
nj.
Case 2: The Large Firm
Now consider the case where φ/q is small so that the ﬁrm is large. It simpliﬁes things






Here the only concern in the ﬁrm’s problem is variable cost. The problem here is a special
case of the Eaton and Kortum (forthcoming) model of geography and trade. An oﬃce at
location j will be the supplier to location k if j has the lowest unit cost at k (including the
out-of-town cost if k 6= j), i.e., if it minimizes
cj + tj,k = c − γnj + tjk + εi,j.











k=1 prj,k · nk
nj
. (12)
163. Implications of the Theory
This section shows how contrasting the behavior of small and large ﬁrms can shed
light on the force of attraction of large cities. Consider a special case of the model where
γ =0 . Call this the concentrated-market model since the other forces have been zeroed
out. This section shows that in the concentrated-market model, the location patterns of
small and large ﬁrms diﬀer in particular ways. An alternative special case is where all the
concentrated-market factors are zeroed out; i.e., τ =0and φ =0 . In the alternative special
case, it is immediate that the ﬁrm’s location behavior is independent of size. (The scale
parameter q factors out of the objective function in (7).) This provides a way to distinguish
the concentrated-market model from the alternative extreme model.
For the rest of this section assume that γ =0so that the concentrated-market model
applies. For the sake of making a sharp and analytically tractable comparison, this section
contrasts the limiting case where the ﬁrm is arbitrarily small (the small ﬁrm) with the limiting
case where the ﬁrm is arbitrarily large (the large ﬁrm). Assume that the logit case applies
so that the formulae for the expected location quotients derived in the last section hold.
My result depends upon the magnitude of the trade friction τ. In the concentrated-
market literature, it is standard to focus on the case where the friction τ is at an intermediate
level. When τ is zero, geography is irrelevant; when τ is arbitrarily large, there is autarky. In
line with this literature, intermediate τ is the interesting case here, as well. The main result
partitions the possible values of τ into three regions, and the intermediate region is the one
that is highlighted. I will argue that the concentrated-market model cannot be consistent
with the data if τ is very large or if τ is very small.
A. Extreme Values for τ
Since τ is varied in this section, let LQS
j (τ) and LQL
j (τ) be the expected location
quotient of city j for the small and large ﬁrms. Using formulae (11) and (12), we see
immediately that in the limiting case where τ goes to zero, expected sales in city j are








At the other extreme of τ, the distributions of small and large ﬁrms are quite diﬀerent.
Small ﬁrms by deﬁnition are constrained to open only a single oﬃce. Fixing the cost draws of
ap a r t i c u l a rﬁrm, for large enough τ, the home-market advantage of the largest city dominates
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Observe that when τ is arbitrarily small and when τ is arbitrarily large, the sales oﬃce
activity of large ﬁrms is evenly distributed across cities in proportion to population. However,
in the data, large ﬁrm activity is disproportionately concentrated in big cities. Hence, if the
concentrated-market model is to be consistent with the data, τ cannot be extremely small or
extremely large. This suggests looking at what happens at intermediate values of τ.
B. Intermediate Values of τ and the Main Result
To obtain my result, it is necessary to make an assumption about the distribution of
city populations. In the result, there is a diﬀerence between medium-sized cities and small
and large cities. For this to make any sense, the population distribution obviously has to
allow for more than two diﬀerent city-size types. To put some structure on the population
distribution, make the relatively standard assumption that the city-size distribution is Pareto,
nj = nJ (1 + J − j)
− 1
α ,
18for α > 0.I n t h e c a s e w h e r e α =1 , this reduces to the rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) where
city size equals the population of the largest city divided by the city rank. It is a well-known
empirical regularity that city sizes tend to obey the rank-size rule. (See Gabaix (1999).)
T h ef o r m u l a ef o rt h el o c a t i o nq u o t i e n t sa r ec u m b e r s o m e ,m a k i n gi td i ﬃcult to obtain
an analytic result. However, they are quite amenable to numerical analysis. With such an
analysis, I have obtained the following characterization:
Result. Suppose that J ≥ 10, and the size distribution is Pareto with coeﬃcient
α ≥ 0.44. Suppose γ =0so that the concentrated-market model applies. Then there exist
two cutoﬀ levels of τ, 0 ≤ ˆ τ1 < ˆ τ2, such that
(i) For τ < ˆ τ1, there exists a j0, 1 <j 0 <J,s u c ht h a t
LQ
S










(ii) For τ ∈ (ˆ τ1,ˆ τ2), there exist a j0 and a j00, satisfying 1 <j 0 <j 00 <J, such that
LQ
S
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(iii) For τ > ˆ τ2,t h e r ee x i s t saj00, 1 <j 00 <J, such that
LQ
S










Observe that the condition α ≥ 0.44 includes the rank-size rule case of α =1 .T h e
excluded case of α < 0.44 is not empirically relevant because in this case virtually the entire
19population is concentrated in the largest cities. It is worth noting that the result also holds if
the actual size distribution of the 273 cities in the data is used instead of the Pareto (which
is not a surprise since the actual distribution is close to Pareto).
Figure 1 illustrates the result for the case where α =1and J =1 0 0 .H e r e t h e c u t o ﬀs
are ˆ τ1 =2 .7 and ˆ τ2 =6 .2. The expected location quotients are plotted as a function of city
size for both the small ﬁrm and the large ﬁrm.
The top panel (A) of Figure 1 illustrates the small τ case, τ < ˆ τ1 (here τ =1 ). In this
range, LQS cuts LQL from above, as claimed in the result. Note that in this region, there is
little diﬀerence between LQS and LQL; both are approximately equal to 1, consistent with
the limit result reported above.
The bottom panel (C) plots the large τ case, τ > ˆ τ2 (here τ =8 ) . In this range,
LQS cuts LQL from below, as claimed in the result. Note that LQL approximately equals 1,
consistent with the limit result for large τ. Also consistent with the earlier result, the small
ﬁrm’s sales are heavily concentrated in the largest city. This explains why, for the largest
city, LQS is so much higher than LQL.
The middle panel (B) illustrates the intermediate case where τ is between the two
cutoﬀs( h e r eτ =4 ). As stipulated in the result and as illustrated in the ﬁgure, LQS lies
above LQL for both small cities and the largest cities. In between the extremes, LQL lies
above LQS. Thus sales of the large ﬁrm are concentrated in the medium-sized cities, away
from the small and large cities, in comparison to the sales of the small ﬁrm.
The intuition for why LQS is above LQL in the large cities is the same as for the
high τ case. But why is LQS above LQL for the smallest cities? To see why, consider ﬁrst
the LQS function for small ﬁrms. Notice that aside from the spike near the largest cities,
this function is relatively ﬂat. Thus, conditioned upon not locating in the biggest city, the
probability of locating in any particular city is roughly proportional to population. This
follows because outside of the largest cities, savings in trade cost from locating in a particular
20city are relatively negligible (since any one city has a small percentage of the population), so
the other factors (i.e., the εij)m a k et h em o s td i ﬀerence. Now consider the LQL function.
The sales of oﬃces in small cities are quite low. This follows because even if the ﬁrm opens
an oﬃce in a small town, the oﬃce will not sell to the whole country. (Recall that the large
ﬁrm will generally have multiple oﬃces.) In contrast, when the small ﬁrm opens an oﬃce
in a small town, this oﬃce sells to the whole country. (The small ﬁrm has a single oﬃce.)
Thus sales in small cities are relatively lower for big ﬁrms than for small ﬁrms.
4. The Location of Sales Oﬃces
The ﬁrst part of this section documents that sales oﬃces are highly concentrated in
big cities. The second part shows that the location patterns, broken down by ﬁrm size, follow
the pattern predicted by the concentrated-market theory. Details about the construction of
tables are relegated to the appendix.
A. Sales Oﬃces Are in Big Cities
Cities are deﬁned to be Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). In the 1997
Economic Census, there are 273 MSAs. The largest is New York, with 20 million people in
1997.5 The smallest is Enid, Oklahoma, with a population of 57,000. The area outside of
MSAs has a population of 54 million people, 20 percent of the total.
Table 1 makes the basic point that sales-oﬃce activity is highly concentrated in large
cities. The table groups cities (MSAs) by population size and includes a category for non-
metropolitan areas. For example, there is a category for cities with a population above 8
million, and this includes three cities, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. The ﬁrst half
of the table reports sales-oﬃce activity measured on a per capita basis. For each geographic
grouping, the activity measure of oﬃces within the geographic category is summed up and
5New York is a consolidated MSA (CMSA). It is an aggregation of 15 primary MSAs (PMSAs), including,
for example, the Newark, New Jersey, PMSA, the Danbury, Connecticut, PMSA, as well as, of course, the
New York, New York, PMSA. This paper treats a CMSA as a single MSA.
21divided by the total population in the geographic category. The bottom half of the table
reports location quotients (LQs). Recall that this equals the geographic category’s share of
national activity measure divided by the geographic category’s share of total population.
Table 1 reports that the total sales of oﬃces located in nonmetropolitan areas is $620
per person living in nonmetropolitan areas. Per capita sales increase to $2,700 for small cities
(under a half million in population) and to $4,920 for cities in the one-half to two million
category. Sales go all the way up to $7,980 and $6,860 for the two largest city-size categories,
more than a tenfold increase compared to nonmetro areas. The sales location quotient (LQ)
for nonmetro areas is only 0.12. This means that the share of U.S. sales of nonmetro sales
oﬃces is only 12 percent of the nonmetro share of population. The LQ increases with city
size all the way up to 1.55 and 1.33 for the largest two size classes.
The other measures of sales-oﬃce activity reveal a similar pattern. Payroll per capita
and operating expenses per capita both increase by a factor of ten, going from the smallest
to the largest city-size categories. Employment and inventories also increase, but the factor
is ﬁve instead of ten.
The signiﬁcant concentration of oﬃce activity in large cities is a recurrent feature of
earlier Census years. Table 2 takes the cross section of MSAs and reports the results of a
simple regression of the log of sales on the log of MSA population.6 The population elasticity
(the slope of the regression line) for sales ranges from 1.63 in 1987 to 1.71 in 1997. Table
2a l s or e p o r t sar e g r e s s i o no fd i ﬀerences in log sales on diﬀerences in log population between
1997 and 1982. The estimate from this “ﬁxed-city eﬀect, ﬁxed-time eﬀect” regression is 1.80,
which is within the ballpark of the cross section estimates. Thus the pattern that relative
sales-oﬃce activity increases with size holds within cities over time as well as across cities.
Table 2 also reports the population elasticity when additional city characteristics are
included in the regression. These characteristics include a measure of education level of
6MSA deﬁnitions change from Census year to Census year. This exercise holds ﬁxed the MSA deﬁnitions
to their 1987 levels. Details are in the appendix.
22the workforce, a measure of airport access, and a measure of manufacturing activity (see the
appendix for details), all of which we would expect to be associated with higher manufacturer
sales-oﬃce activity in a city. The additional variables do play some role in the regression,
raising the R2 for 1997 from 0.75 to 0.82, and they lower the population elasticity from 1.71
to 1.56. Still, the population elasticity remains quite high.
One issue that can be raised about this analysis is that the MSA is a crude and
sometimes arbitrary deﬁnition of a city. The appendix considers a richer geographic analysis
that uses county-level data (which is ﬁner than MSA data) and that uses information about
neighboring counties. The quantitative results with this more complicated structure are
similar to the results with MSA data.
B. Location Patterns Broken Down by Firm Size
The Census data have a ﬁrm identiﬁer that makes it possible to link all the oﬃces
of the same ﬁrm. Deﬁne ﬁrm size t ob es a l e ss u m m e du pa c r o s sa l lt h eo ﬃces of the ﬁrm.
Table 3 provides some selected statistics for ﬁrms in diﬀerent size categories. Note the clear
pattern that larger ﬁr m sh a v em o r eo ﬃces. The smallest ﬁrms (with sales under $25 million)
have on average 1.9 sales oﬃces per ﬁrm. The largest ﬁrms (with sales over $100 million)
have 22.5 oﬃces per ﬁrm. This is obvious evidence of the extent of scale economies, and this
information will be used in the estimation in the next section.
Table 4 shows how the distribution of sales across city-size classes varies with diﬀerent
ﬁrm-size categories. The table reports estimated location quotients derived from a logit model
that includes dummy variables for industry. The estimated sales shares are determined by
evaluating the logit model at the dummy variable means, and they are converted into location
quotients by dividing through by population. (See the appendix for details.) The resulting
estimates are very close to what one gets with a raw cross tabulation that does not include
industry controls.
The pattern predicted by the concentrated-market model with intermediate trade costs
23is a striking feature of Table 4. Observe ﬁrst that if we look at the rural areas and the smallest
cities, there is a clear pattern that the LQ declines with ﬁrm size. In the smallest size class
in the rural areas, the LQ is 0.30. This falls all they way down to 0.04 for the largest ﬁrm-
size class. When we look at the largest city-size class, we see that the location quotients
also decline as ﬁrm size increases. In the three smallest ﬁrm-size categories, the LQs are
1.74, 1.81, and 1.76. But the LQs fall to 1.55, 1.55, and 1.37 for the three largest ﬁrm-size
categories. Thus for bigger ﬁrms, the distribution of sales is shifted away from the very small
cities and the very largest cities, toward the medium-sized cities.
The patterns in this table are highly statistically signiﬁcant in the sense that the hy-
pothesis that the distributions are constant across ﬁrm size can be rejected with an extremely
high degree of conﬁdence.
The patterns in Table 4 are robust to alternative ways of constructing the table. The
table changes little when 1992 data are used instead of 1997 data. The key pattern that the
distribution shifts towards the middle as ﬁrm size increases continues to hold if establishment
counts are used instead of sales. It also holds if ﬁrm size is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fn u m b e r so f
oﬃces rather than total sales.
5. Structural Estimates
The implication of the concentrated-market theory derived in Section 3 was found to
be a salient feature of the data in Section 4. An alternative model with only knowledge
spillovers or Hecksher-Ohlin factors does not have this implication. This suggests that the
concentrated-market factor plays some role. But the concentrated-market factor is not
necessarily the only force at work.
As a preliminary attempt to quantify the importance of the concentrated-market factor
relative to the other factors, this section estimates the structural parameters of the oﬃce-
location model. The ﬁrst subsection describes the estimation procedures. The second
subsection discusses the estimates and the goodness of ﬁto ft h em o d e l . T h el a s tt w o
24subsections use the estimates to return to the two basic questions of this paper: Why are
sales oﬃces in big cities? Why do cities form in the ﬁrst place?
A. Procedure
For the estimation exercise, I generalize the speciﬁcation of the selling cost to allow it
to depend upon observable city-speciﬁc characteristics such as the education level in the city.
In particular, the selling cost of ﬁrm i in city j incorporates a city-speciﬁct e r mξj,
cij = c − γnj + ξj + εij. (13)
The variable ξj depends upon observable city characteristics,
ξj ≡ η1˜ z1,j + η2˜ z2,j + η3˜ z3,j,
where ˜ z1,j is the measured city education level, ˜ z2,j is airport access and ˜ z3,j is the level of
manufacturing activity in city j. (These controls were considered in the earlier regression
analysis and are deﬁned in the appendix.) Reﬁne the earlier variable zj to be the skill and
amenity levels in a city that are not captured by ˜ z1,j, ˜ z2,j, ˜ z3,j and continue to assume the
deterministic relationship zj = ωnj.
Recall that the εij random variable is the minimum of nj draws from an i.i.d. variable
x with some distribution F(x). Here I assume x is normal with a mean of zero and variance
of σ2
x. Without loss of generality I can rescale all the costs so that σ2
x =1 .A s a n o t h e r
normalization, I set the constant term c in the cost function to be zero since changing it does
not aﬀect any choices.
The parameters that remain to be estimated are φ (the ﬁxed cost), τ (the friction),
γ (the combined knowledge-spillover and Hecksher-Ohlin parameter), and the coeﬃcients η1,
η2, η3 on the city-speciﬁc characteristics.
It simpliﬁes computation to discretize ﬁrm size. I use six sales size categories, the
same ones used in Table 4. Let h ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6} index these categories. I assume that
the per capita sales qh of each ﬁrm in a given category h are equal to the mean per capita
25sales of ﬁrms in the category. Table 5 shows the mean sales per ﬁrm in each category and
the cell counts.
Oﬃces outside of MSAs are not incorporated in the estimation. These account for
less than 2 percent of total sales.7
Take a particular value of the parameter vector θ =( φ,τ,γ,η1,η2,η3) as given. Take
as data the population share nj of each city j and the city characteristics (z1,j,z 2,j,z3,j), j
from 1 to 273 (the number of MSAs). The problem of a particular ﬁrm depends upon its size
category qh as well as its particular draw of the vector εi =(εi,1,εi,2,...,εi,273). The problem
cannot be solved analytically, so simulation methods are used instead. The problem faced by
the ﬁrm is somewhat complex as there are 2273 − 1 diﬀerent combinations of possible oﬃce
locations. Simulating the probability of each of these choices can in principle be accomplished
by taking random draws of the vector εi and solving the ﬁrm’s problem. However, given
the extraordinarily large number of choices, this is not a practical alternative, precluding a
simulated maximum likelihood approach.
Instead, I employ a simulated method of moments approach. I focus on matching the
aspect of the data that was highlighted in the theoretical section, namely, how the distribution
of sales across cities varies with ﬁrm size. I also include the moments for the number of oﬃces
per ﬁrm, as this naturally contains information about the extent of scale economies.
To explain the approach, I deﬁne additional notation. Fix the parameter vector θ,
the ﬁrm size class h, and a given random vector ε. Solve the problem of the ﬁrm, and let
sh
j(θ,ε) be the share of the ﬁrm’s total sales originating in an oﬃce in city j in the solution.








7Firm size is deﬁned as the sum of sales over oﬃces in MSAs.
26where, again, nj is city j’s population share. Let Oh(θ,ε) be the count of the number of








where, again, χj is an indicator variable for whether an oﬃce is opened at location j.N o w

















I am unable to obtain an analytical expression for these expectations. But I was able to use
simulation methods to obtain an approximation. I drew the random ε vector 4,000 times and
then kept this set of draws ﬁxed. For each size class h, and parameter vector θ,It h e ns o l v e d
the ﬁrm’s problem for each of the 4,000 diﬀerent random vectors and took the averages to
approximate the above expectations. Let g LQ
h
,j(θ) and e Oh(θ) be the approximation calculated
this way. The greater the number of draws, the better the approximation. I stopped at
4,000 because in practice it appeared to be large enough for my purposes.8
8When I estimate the model using only 1,000 simulations, the results are not that diﬀerent.
27The location quotients are linearly independent, so city 1 is excluded. For a given
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Now turn to the data. Let NUMh denote the actual number of ﬁrms in size class h
from Table 5. Suppose that for each size class h, ﬁrms are indexed by i from 1 to NUMh.
Let LQh
i,j be the location quotient in city j of ﬁrm i in size class h, and let Oh
i be the ﬁrm’s














Suppose the sample analogs are stacked in an analogous way as (15) and (16), and let m be
the (1638×1) vector of the moments in the data.
28The simulated method of moments estimate of θ is obtained by minimizing
min
θ
[m − f m(θ)]
0V
−1[m − f m(θ)]. (17)
The weighting matrix V −1 is an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix obtained by using
t h es a m p l ev a r i a n c eo ft h eﬁrm-level moments. I had problems diﬀerentiating f m(θ) because
it is a step function (given the discrete choice nature of the problem and the fact that the
number of simulated draws is ﬁnite). This precluded the use of a gradient-type method to
solve (17). Instead, I used a simplex-type method called the amoeba method.A b o o t s t r a p
procedure was used to approximate standard errors. Details about the bootstrap procedure
are contained in the appendix.
B. The Estimates
Table 6 reports two sets of estimates. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (Model 1), the ad-
ditional city characteristics are constrained to be zero (η1 = η2 = η3 =0 ). In the second
speciﬁcation (Model 2), the city characteristic parameters are allowed to be nonzero.
In Model 1, the estimates of τ and γ are approximately the same (1.7 and 1.6).
Recall that in the problem of a small ﬁrm locating a single oﬃce, the sum τ +γ is multiplied
by population size nj to determine the cost of locating at j (equation (10)). Therefore,
my estimates show that the τ parameter and the γ parameter make virtually the same
contribution in inducing a small, single-oﬃce ﬁrm to disproportionately locate in large cities.
I nM o d e l2 ,t h ee s t i m a t eo fτ is stable, but the estimate of γ almost doubles. The standard
error of γ is much higher than for τ. (The γ parameter tended to bounce around in other
speciﬁcations I considered while τ was stable.) Even with the doubling of γ,t h eτ parameter
continues to play a large role in explaining why small, single-oﬃce ﬁrms disproportionately
locate in big cities. Here the contributions of τ and γ are 1
3 and 2
3, respectively.
The estimates of the ﬁxed cost parameter φ are relatively small. To interpret the
magnitude, it helps to know that the population share of New York–the largest U.S. city–is
nNY =0 .1 and the share of Enid, Oklahoma–the smallest U.S. city–is nEnid =0 .0003.T h e
29smallest ﬁrm type (h =1 ) has per capita sales of q1 =7 .5 (Table 5). If the smallest ﬁrm
were to locate an oﬃce in New York, the savings in out-of-town costs would be τq1nNY =
1.7×7.5×0.1 ≈ 1.2. This savings is approximately the same as the ﬁx e dc o s ti nM o d e l2a n d
about 50 percent higher than the ﬁxed cost in Model 1. This doesn’t mean a small ﬁrm will
always open an oﬃce in New York, because the ﬁrm also has to consider the idiosyncratic cost
realization εNY for New York. Note that given the small population of Enid, the ﬁxed cost
swamps the out-of-town cost savings from opening up an oﬃce there. The largest ﬁrm type
(h =6 ) has per capita sales of q6 =4 ,856.9.F o r s u c h a ﬁrm, the savings in out-of-town cost
f r o mo p e n i n gi nE n i di s τq6nEnid ≈ 2.3, which is larger than the ﬁxed cost, but not so much
larger as to make the ﬁxed cost immaterial. The largest ﬁrms will not all necessarily have
an oﬃce in Enid because the selling cost in Enid also matters, in addition to the out-of-town
cost and ﬁxed cost.
In Model 2, the estimates for the airport and manufacturing activity variables are both
positive, as expected. The coeﬃcient on the education variable is approximately zero. (It is
actually negative in sign.)
The chi-squared statistic for both models is quite high. It is not surprising that
a highly stylized model with a few parameters and 3,786 ﬁrms would fail a conventional
statistical test.
Nonetheless, given all that it is being asked to do, this highly stylized model does a
good job of ﬁtting the data. Table 7 compares moments in the actual data (Panel A) with
moments in the Model 1 economy (Panel B). (Panel C is discussed in the next subsection.)
Model 1 captures the qualitative features of the actual data, whether we look up and down
the columns or across the rows. In the actual data, LQsales declines as we move down the
table for the largest and smallest cities, while it increases for cities in the 2 million—8 million
category. The directions of these eﬀects are the same in the Model 1 economy. The model
underpredicts oﬃces per ﬁrm for the smallest size class and overpredicts oﬃces per ﬁrm for
30larger ﬁrms. The results for the Model 2 economy are similar, but are not displayed here.
In addition to the two models presented here, I have considered various alternatives.
The estimates change little when I use 1992 data instead of 1997 data. The estimates
change little when I exclude the smallest ﬁrm-size class, which consists of over half of all the
ﬁrms (but a small portion of total oﬃces). I have also estimated a version of the model
with substantially fewer moments, by aggregating the location quotients to the aggregated
city-size categories used in Table 7. The estimate of γ falls substantially to 0.07. But
the estimates of τ and φ are 1.14 and 0.35, which are in the same ballpark as the Model 1
estimates. Thus, my ﬁnding that the concentrated-market factor is important is robust to
alternative speciﬁcations.
C. Why Are Sales Oﬃces in Big Cities?
A goal of this paper is to separate out the importance of the concentrated-market
factor in accounting for the concentration of sales oﬃces in big cities. One way to do this is
to zero out the other forces of concentration to see how much concentration would result from
the concentrated-market factor alone. Panel C in Table 7 takes the estimate of φ and γ from
Model 1, but sets γ =0so that the knowledge-spillover and Hecksher-Ohlin forces are zeroed
out. It is evident in the table that there still remains substantial concentration, even though
γ =0 . For example, in the smallest ﬁrm-size class, the LQ in the biggest cities is 1.38 as
compared to 1.74 with the original value of γ in Model 1. So concentration is about half as
large, when concentration is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the LQ and 1. Interestingly,
for the larger ﬁrm sizes, the diﬀerence in concentration is even less. For example, for ﬁrms
in the 50 million—100 million size class, the LQ is 1.60 with γ =0compared to 1.81 in the
benchmark case, a relatively small diﬀerence.
If we were to use the parameters from Model 2 as the benchmark, the diﬀerences are
somewhat larger since γ is larger in Model 2. Nonetheless, with the exception of the smallest
sales-size class, concentration in the largest cities with γ =0i sa b o u th a l fo fw h a ti ti si nt h e
31benchmark model. I conclude that the concentrated-market factor is approximately half the
story for why sales oﬃces concentrate in large cities.
D. Why Form Cities?
The model does not endogenize city formation. The sales-oﬃce sector is viewed as
small relative to the economy as a whole, and the city sizes (n1,n2,...,nJ) are taken as given.
Nonetheless, some sense of the forces that lead to city formation can be obtained by analyzing
how total intermediation costs would change if population were concentrated in large cities.
To keep the analysis simple, consider a case of a ﬁrm that is so small that it opens a
single oﬃce. Suppose, hypothetically, the ﬁrm’s problem were changed in two ways First,
the structure of cities changes, with New York absorbing the entire population of all the other
cities. Second, the ﬁrm is constrained to locate only in New York. The savings in out-of-town
cost per unit of sales from this change have a lower bound of (1−nNY)×τ =0 .9×1.7 ≈ 1.5.
If the ﬁrm would have located in New York anyway, this is the exact savings. If the ﬁrm
would have located outside of New York, the savings in trade friction are even greater.
To set a sense of the magnitude of these savings, consider the potential impact of this
change on the ﬁrm’s selling cost. Recall that the selling cost per unit equals
cij = c − γnj + εij. (18)
For now, assume that the population shift to New York were to leave cij and its components
ﬁxed for all i and j.I f t h e ﬁrm always opens in New York, it may be forgoing a location
with a lower selling cost. For now, focus on the random εij term. The expected value of the








If a ﬁrm were to always locate in the city with the lowest εij, its expected selling cost would be
320.7 more units than if it always located in New York. The cost increases through the ε term
from being constrained to locate in New York can be no more than 0.7. The lower bound on
the savings in trade cost is twice as high as the upper bound on the cost increase from the
higher ε. Put another way, the savings in the trade friction from concentrating population
in New York substantially outweigh the gains from specializing according to comparative
advantage (i.e., having the lowest εij city get the oﬃce).
Of course, shifting the entire U.S. population to New York should have some eﬀect
on the cost cij at each location to the advantage of New York. Unfortunately, my analysis
cannot pin down this eﬀect. Recall that γ has a component due to knowledge spillovers and a
component due to Hecksher-Ohlin. My procedure cannot disentangle these separate eﬀects.
In the extreme case where all of γ is knowledge spillovers, shifting the entire U.S. population
to New York will result in savings from knowledge spillovers that are approximately the same
order of magnitude as the savings in out-of-town costs discussed above.
6. Conclusion
The narrow question of this paper is, Why are sales oﬃces in big cities? To answer
this question, the paper develops a new theory of the site location decision of a ﬁrm with
potentially multiple establishments. It shows that when the concentrated-market factor
emphasized by Krugman (1991 and elsewhere) are at work, the distribution of sales activity
for large ﬁrms will be relatively concentrated in medium-sized cities, while for small ﬁrms,
it will be concentrated in small and large cities. Analysis of U.S. Census micro data shows
that this implication is a salient feature of sales oﬃces in the United States. A ﬁrst cut
estimation of the model indicates that the concentrated-market factor is approximately half
the explanation for why sales oﬃces are in big cities.
The broader question of this paper is, Why are there cities? The work here can only
speak to the beneﬁts of city formation to the sales-oﬃce sector, a sector that makes up 1
percent of the national payroll. The preliminary estimates of this paper indicate that the
33savings in out-of-town costs or trade frictions that accompany the formation of large cities
are large compared to any oﬀsetting force of dispersion of comparative advantage. To the
extent that broader sectors such as ﬁnance and business services are similar to sales-oﬃce
activity, reductions in trade frictions will be a signiﬁcant force leading to the formation of
cities.
An u m b e ro fs i m p l i ﬁcations were made in the analysis to get started. In future work,
the analysis could be enriched in many ways. The theory recognizes that ﬁrms may have
idiosyncratic reasons to locate a sales oﬃce in a particular city. By linking the sales-oﬃce
data with the micro data on plant locations from the Census of Manufacturers, it might be
possible to quantify location-speciﬁcb e n e ﬁts to particular ﬁrms. The theory assumes that
all sales are intermediated by a ﬁrm-owned sales oﬃce. But the analysis could be extended
to allow ﬁrms to decide between a sales oﬃce and a merchant wholesaler. The empirical
analysis could be extended to exploit the panel nature of the data set.
The sales-oﬃce sector has special attributes that make it uniquely interesting to study.
But the theoretical and empirical ﬁndings of this analysis can potentially be extended to other
sectors. With the increasingly pervasive use of scanners, it may be possible to measure the
total industry output levels of narrowly deﬁned diﬀerentiated products. To the extent that
the concentrated-market factor is important, my ﬁndings suggest that diﬀerentiated goods
with a small national market (a market that supports relatively few plants) will tend to be in
large cities and small cities. Diﬀerentiated products with a large national market (one that
supports a large number of plants) will tend to be in medium-sized cities.
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7. Notes for Section 3
A. Table 1
The ﬁgures in Table 1 are estimates constructed with the publicly available geographic
data. The U.S. Census Bureau is reluctant to release new raw tabulations of geographic data
since it might be possible to combine this information with previously released information
to back out information that the Census did not intend to release.9 Disclosure problems do
not arise with the econometric estimates reported after Table 1. I have recalculated Table 1
with the raw data, and the diﬀerences are immaterial. The coverage of the publicly released
data ranges from 95 percent of establishments in the over 8 million city-size category to 62
percent in the under half a million category.
B. Table 2
MSA deﬁnitions change from Census year to Census year. In order to use a ﬁxed
deﬁnition of MSAs for this analysis, I used the 1987 deﬁnition of MSAs for Table 2. Outside
of New England, this is easy to do because MSAs are deﬁned as aggregations of counties,
and county deﬁnitions (with minor exceptions) do not change over time. In New England,
MSAs are not aggregations of counties. However, for the 1987 Economic Census, the Census
Bureau provides county-based deﬁnitions of MSAs that approximate the actual MSAs in New
England. The 1987 county-equivalent MSA deﬁnitions were used to deﬁne MSAs for all the
regressions in Table 2, except for the regression with additional controls, which used the 1997
Census deﬁnition.
The variables used in the regression with additional controls are deﬁned as follows.
The education measure is the percentage of workers 25 years and older with a bachelor’s,
9For example, the public data release includes the sales data for the entire Chicago area except for the
s e v e ne s t a b l i s h m e n t si nt h eK a n k a k e eP M S A . I fIw e r et om a k eat a b l et h a ts p e c i ﬁed total sales in Chicago,
then one could back out the sales of the seven establishments in Kankakee that the Census did not intend to
disclose.
35graduate, or professional degree in the MSA in 1990. The source is the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1996). The airport variable is domestic enplanements in 1999 per person. The
source is the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2000). The manufacturing intensity
measure is sales of manufacturing plants per person. The source is the 1997 Economic Census
(U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001)).
Table A1 shows a cross tabulation of these three variables. Larger cities have a higher
fraction of college-educated workers and have more enplanements per person. Manufacturing
activity tends to be concentrated in small cities rather than large. Table A2 reports the
results of running log sales on log population, log education, the level of airport activity, and
log manufacturing activity. The elasticity estimate for education is large at 0.30, but it is
not statistically signiﬁcant. The elasticity estimate for manufacturing activity is sizable at
0.62. The magnitude of the airport variable is relatively high, and both the manufacturing
and airport coeﬃcients are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
C. City Deﬁnitions
This subsection shows that the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 of the main paper
are robust to consideration of an alternative, richer geographic structure.
T h eM S Ac a nb eam u r k yd e ﬁnition of a city. Half of New Jersey is in the New York
consolidated MSA, and the other half is in the Philadelphia MSA. Where to draw the line in
New Jersey may be arbitrary, but it has the big eﬀect in the analysis of determining whether
a particular part of New Jersey is classiﬁed as being in an MSA with 20 million people or one
with 6 million people. When this boundary line is crossed, there is a discontinuous increase
in population.
The alternative analysis discussed here does not rely on the arbitrary way that MSA
boundaries may be deﬁned and reduces the problem of discontinuities. The analysis uses
data on the 3,111 counties in the 48 contiguous states (plus the District of Columbia). An
advantage of this procedure is that the county is a signiﬁcantly ﬁner geographic unit than
36the MSA. (For example, the New York metro area is made up of 30 counties.) Moreover, by
using county data, I am able to incorporate non-MSA counties into the statistical analysis as
well as MSA counties.
For each county i, I determined the identities of all counties within 30 miles of the same
county i.10 Let neigpopi denote the total population of these neighboring counties, including
the population of county i. Counties were ranked by neigpopi and divided into 10 regions of
counties of approximately equal population. For example, the ﬁr s tr e g i o nc o n s i s t so f1 , 3 9 5
counties with the lowest values of neigpopi, and together these sparsely populated counties
account for approximately 10 percent of the continental U.S. population. The top group
with the highest values of neigpopi consists of 17 counties and 10 percent of the population.
For each of these regions, using the 1997 data, I calculated the various measures of sales-oﬃce
activity on a per capita basis and made a cross tabulation for the diﬀerent neigpopi groupings
similar to the ﬁrst part of Table 1. Disclosure concerns preclude publication of these tables,
but it is possible to report summary statistics. Table A3 reports a regression of the (log
of the) per capita activity measure on the (log of the) average neighboring population. For
example, the coeﬃcient when per capita sales is the activity measure is 0.64. To compare
this to the results from the MSA regressions in Table 2, we need to add 1 to the coeﬃcient
in Table A3 (since the left side variable here is a per capita number). Adding 1 to 0.64, we
see that the estimate of 1.64 is quite close to the earlier MSA regression result of 1.71 for the
same year. Table A3 reveals the same patterns as does Table 2. The largest eﬀects are on
sales, payroll, and operating expenses, while employment and inventories are in between, but
still quite large. The same analysis for the earlier years yields similar results.
10The geographic centroid of the county was used to deﬁne county location.
378. Notes for Section 4
A. Procedure Used to Construct Table 4
I estimated a logit model for the distribution of the number of oﬃces and the sales
of oﬃces for the same MSA size categories as in Table 1. The ﬁrm-size categories are (in
millions of dollars) under 25, 25—50, 50—100, 100—250, 250—1000, and 1000 and over. Let s
denote a particular city-size category (s =1for non-MSA, s =2for MSAs with less than
half a million, etc.). Let h denote a particular ﬁrm-size category (h =1for under 25 million,
h =2for 25—50, etc.). Suppose that the probability that a particular oﬃce i locates in
al o c a t i o no ft y p es depends upon the size class h of the ﬁrm that the oﬃce is part of as
well as the industry k of establishment i. (Note that industry is deﬁned at the establishment
level, not the ﬁrm level.) To write this in a multinomial logit fashion, let x be a vector of
dummy variables for ﬁrm size, so that xsize
h,i =1if establishment i is in size class h and is zero
otherwise. Analogously, suppose that y is a vector of dummy variables for industry, so that
yind
k,i =1if establishment i is in industry k and is zero otherwise. Let αs and β
s be a vector
of coeﬃcients for choice s. Then with the multinomial logit speciﬁcation, the probability










5). I then used the parameter
estimates to calculate the estimated probability of being in a particular size class s,f o r
each given level of h, and given that industries’ dummy variables are evaluated at the mean
across all establishments (so each is the fraction of oﬃces in the given industry). To make
the analysis comparable to the earlier tables, I divided each probability by the fraction of
population in the area to create a location quotient measure.
The above procedure calculates an establishment location quotient. In Table 4 of the
paper, I report a sales location quotient. This is constructed in a similar manner as above,
except the measure is sales-weighted. In particular, I regarded each million dollars of sales
38as a separate observation and estimated the model above to determine the probability that
the million dollars in sales is allocated to each city-size class. I then calculated the location
quotient in the analogous way. The broad patterns in the establishment location quotient
(not shown) are the same as for the sales location quotient (Table 4).
9. Notes for Section 5
The additional city characteristics used in Model 2 are speciﬁed in levels. The units
are deﬁn e di nT a b l eA 1 .
Since the objective function is a step function, it proved to be diﬃcult to approximate
derivatives. This precluded me from obtaining estimates of the standard errors in the usual
way. Instead I used a bootstrap procedure. Let ˆ θ1 be the parameter estimates for Model 1
reported in Table 6. Setting θ = ˆ θ1, I drew 25 simulated data sets. (For Model 2, I drew
21 simulated data sets.) Each simulated data set has the same number of ﬁr m si ne a c hs i z e
class as in the actual data. I then reestimated the model with each of the simulated data
sets. The reported standard error is the statistic calculated from the distribution of the 25
estimates (21 for Model 2).
When I calculated the weighting matrix for the simulated data in the same way I
calculated that matrix for the actual data, the weighting matrix was singular. (This didn’t
happen with the actual data). My solution was to take ˆ θ and approximate the optimal
weighting matrix. This was accomplished by simulating the distribution of the moments
with a large number of ﬁrms of each type (10,000) rather than the actual number of ﬁrms.
This ﬁxed, optimal weighting matrix was used in the estimation procedures with the simulated
data. As a result, reported standard errors do not take into account sampling variation of
the weighting matrix. They do take into account sampling variation of the moments as well
as the approximation error (since a new set of ε draws are obtained for each estimation set).
In Model 2, it is optimal for the smallest ﬁrm to always have a single oﬃce, so there
is no variance of this moment. Hence, even the optimal weighting matrix is singular here.
39For this case, I substituted into the weighting matrix an estimate of the actual variance of
this moment in the real data in place of zero.
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42Figure 1
LQ in Model by City Size* for Three Levels of τ




*In each panel, the x variable on the horizontal axis is the cumulative population
of cities sorted in ascending population, and the y variable is the location

































           MSA Population (millions)
    Non-
MSA
   Under
0.5   0.5–2    2–8  Over 8
Per Capita Measures
   Sales ($1,000 per person) .62 2.70 4.92 7.98 6.86
   Employment (per 1,000 in population) .99 2.71 3.86 4.86 5.23
   Payroll ($1,000 per person) .03 .11 .18 .27 .28
   Operating Expenses
   ($1,000 per person)
.07 .22 .36 .54 .61
   Inventories ($1,000 per person) .05 .14 .16 .22 .24
Location Quotients
   Sales .12 .52 .95 1.55 1.33
   Employment .26 .72 .03 1.30 1.40
   Payroll .17 .57 .93 1.44 1.46
   Operating Expenses .19 .57 .92 1.38 1.56
   Inventories .30 .85 .96 1.28 1.40
Number of MSAs       —       194         57         19           3
Source: Author’s calculations with publicly available data
from the 1997 Census of Wholesale TradeTable 2
MSA-Level Regressions:
Log Sales on Log Population
     Slope
    (std. err.)     R
2
Cross-Section Regressions  (year)
   1982 1.64
(.05)
.78
   1987 1.63
(.06)
.76
   1992 1.68
(.06)
.75
   1997 1.71
(.06)
.75
   1997 With Controls for
•  Education
•  Airport Access









Source: Author’s calculations with confidential micro data
from the Census of Wholesale Trade, 1982–97Table 3
















Under 25 2,209 4,091 1.9 16.6 4.1
25–49.99 463 1,711 3.7 16.6 9.7
50–99.99 362 2,120 5.9 25.5 12.0
100 and Over 942 21,209 22.5 1,191.0 56.2
All Firms 3,976 29,131 7.3 1,249.7 42.9
Source: Author’s calculations with publicly available data
from the 1997 Census of Wholesale TradeTable 4
Estimated Location Quotients From Logit Model
by Sales Size of Firm






0.5 0.5–2 2–8 Over 8
Under 25 .30 .61 .96 1.31 1.74
25–50 .21 .56 .94 1.38 1.81
50–100 .13 .39 .93 1.58 1.76
100–250 .18 .50 1.08 1.49 1.55
250–1000 .15 .40 1.10 1.55 1.55
Over 1000 .04 .38 1.05 1.80 1.37
Source: Author’s calculations with confidential micro data
from the 1997 Census of  Wholesale TradeTable 5
Mean Sales Size and Cell Counts
by Sales-Size Category












Over 1000 4,856.9 196
Source: Author’s calculations from confidential























λ college                    — –.0012
(.0003)
λ airports                    — .027
(.003)




                  273                  273
Number of
Firms
               3,786               3,786
Chi-Squared
Statistic
          5,863.95          4,890.56
Source: Author’s estimates with confidential micro data
from the 1997 Census of Wholesale TradeTable 7
Comparison of Model 1 With 1997 Census Data
A.  The 1997 Census Data
Sales Location Quotient




Firm Under 0.5 0.5–2 2–8 Over 8
Under 25 1.7 .76 .91 1.04 1.27
25–50 3.3 .62 .78 1.09 1.47
50–100 4.9 .52 .80 1.13 1.48
100–250 7.6 .55 .89 1.16 1.28
250–1000 13.8 .44 .89 1.22 1.29
Over 1000 28.4 .32 .85 1.33 1.28
B.  Model 1
Sales Location Quotient




Firm Under 0.5 0.5–2 2–8 Over 8
Under 25 1.4 .72 .75 .90 1.74
25–50 5.3 .62 .65 .93 1.90
50–100 9.3 .56 .60 1.05 1.81
100–250 15.8 .50 .58 1.17 1.71
250–1000 27.3 .44 .66 1.20 1.61
Over 1000 49.9 .46 .75 1.18 1.52
C.  Model 1 With the γ  Parameter Set to Zero
Sales Location Quotient




Firm Under 0.5 0.5–2 2–8 Over 8
Under 25 1.4 .85 .88 .95 1.38
25–50 5.4 .73 .74 .95 1.65
50–100 9.5 .65 .67 1.08 1.60
100–250 16.2 .57 .65 1.18 1.53
250–1000 28.4 .50 .72 1.21 1.45
Over 1000 52.6 .52 .81 1.19 1.38Table A1
Distribution of City Characteristics





0.5 0.5–2 2–8 Over 8
Education Level
(% of population 25 years
 and older with 4 or more years
 of college)
13.26 18.56 20.44 24.64 23.80
Airport Activity
(Domestic enplanements per
  person in 1999)
      — .92 2.76 4.06 2.64
Manufacturing Activity
(Sales of manufacturing plants,
 $1,000 per person in 1999)
14.54 16.65 15.36 14.27 10.86Table A2
MSA Regression With Population and Other Factors
(Dependent Variable = Log Sales)
Variable
  Estimate













N       273Table A3
Regression Results for Neighboring Population Decile Groupings:
Log of Per Capita Measures on







   Sales .64
(.08)
.88
   Employment .45
(.05)
.91
   Payroll .59
(.06)
.92
   Operating Expenses .57
(.05)
.94
   Inventory .44
(.05)
.92